Friday, April 12 • 2:00pm - 2:45pm
Cooperation under Anarchy: The Case of Nuclear Arms Control

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One of the central dilemmas of international relations is how do states cooperate in an environment in which there is no higher authority to ensure that they abide by their commitments as there is in domestic politics. In the area of nuclear weapons, does this mean that arms races are inevitable or are there conditions in which states in conflict can engage in arms control? Through a simulation known as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, this class will explore the conditions under which cooperation is possible using both real and hypothetical arms control agreements.


Kenneth Rodman

William R. Cotter Distinguished Teaching Professor of Government

Friday April 12, 2019 2:00pm - 2:45pm
Room 215, Lovejoy Building

Attendees (16)